This paper analyzes the effectiveness of the control schemes in the Indian tea industry during the Great Depression, whereby producers attempted to collude by reducing output. Analysis of data from a panel of plantations shows that collusion was effective.
INTRODUCTION
The phenomenon of overproduction widely affected agricultural commodities in the interwar period. Price support schemes through restriction of output or export were tried out in many commodities. Since most primary commodities have low price elasticities of demand, output restriction increases the revenues and profits of the producers, and is undoubtedly in their collective interest. Nevertheless, each individual producer has a strong incentive to expand output in response to higher prices, and thus such schemes for restricting output become difficult to enforce. Enforcement of collusion can be a problem at two levels: first, producers from another country can enter the market and second, producers within a country can deviate from the agreement. Enforcement problems are particularly severe in markets with a large number of producers, which are close to the competitive paradigm. This is the case in most agricultural markets, and in these markets, higher prices create incentives for producers to expand output. This paper examines the schemes which aimed to restrict output in the Indian tea industry during the Depression. Our focus in on the so-called control schemes of the years 1930 and 1933. These schemes are of particular interest since there was an explicit, voluntary agreement by the producers to restrict output. Both the explicitness and the voluntary nature of this agreement is noteworthy. Since the agreement to reduce output was voluntary and not legally enforceable, the agreement must have been enforced non-cooperatively. Further, 1 the explicitness of the agreement and of the debates regarding its continuance is a major advantage for two reasons. First, it allows us to separate the years in which producers attempted collusion from the years that they did not. Second, the reasons for the continuance/suspension of collusion can also be discerned from this debate. This explicitness is a major advantage of a historical studies of collusion (see also the work of Porter, 1983) , since anti-trust legislation no longer permits explicit collusion in most countries.
In order to analyze the effectiveness of collusion, this paper analyzes the output decisions of the plantations at the micro level. We rely upon a panel data set of output, prices and acreage for a sample of 114 tea plantations in Eastern India, the main tea producing region in the country. Our main finding is that plantations reduced output in the years of operation of the control scheme. The extent of this output reduction is significant, in terms of size, as well as statistically. The apparent success of the scheme appears paradoxical given the large number of tea plantations in the industry and the relatively high short run supply elasticity of tea.
We offer two complementary explanations for our surprising finding. First, we suggest that the organizational structure of the industry was one major factor which facilitated "cooperation" or collusion between plantations in output reduction. Plantations were managed mainly by a small number of "managing agents", and this ensured a higher degree of monopoly in the industry, in terms of the effective control structure. The 114 firms were mainly managed by thirteen managing agents, but five of these managing agents controlled 62 firms. Since each managing agent was responsible for a number of plantations, we suggest that each managing agent did not seek to maximize the profits of each plantation taken separately, but tried to optimize the performance of the set of plantations under their control, as a whole. We suggest that the industry effectively functioned as a "repeated oligopoly", so that collusion was sustained despite producers having the incentive to free ride in the short run.
In addition to the above "economic" explanation for the success of the control scheme, we would also like to suggest that there were socio-political reasons for differential behaviour of different producers. The number of managing agents, while small in relation to the number of plantations, is still relatively large. The managing agents belonged to a small and cohesive social group, of British nationals in a colonial environment. As a cohesive group, they might have been able to impose social sanctions on any member who violated the social norm, and this may have helped to sustain collusive behaviour in the economic domain. In contrast, the smaller and newer producers of the peripheral regions were mainly Indian. Being peripheral to the main social group, they were immune to its sanctions.
The organization of this paper is as follows. Section 2 describes the main features of the market for tea. Section 3 outlines the structure of ownership and control in the Indian tea industry. Section 4 describes the control schemes. Section 5 sets out a simple model of noncooperative collusion. Section 3 6 presents our econometric model and estimations. Section 7 discusses possible explanations for our results.
DETERMINANTS OF DEMAND AND SUPPLY
Britain was the main consumer of tea. Over 50 percent of total world exports of tea was absorbed by Britain.
It was the demand and supply in this market that determined international tea prices. India, Ceylon and Indonesia controlled over 80 per cent of the world tea exports. India, the country of our focus, was a major producing country and over 85 percent of India's tea exports was to the United Kingdom. Table 1 shows the overwhelming importance of the British market. Table   2 shows the market shares of the main exporting countries for selected years in the period 1927-1938. Trends in tea prices are influenced by some special features of the demand and supply of this consumption good. On the demand side, tea occupies a small proportion in the consumers' budget. Up to a certain level of demand for tea is sensitive to changes in price and income. Thereafter, the product shows low price and income elasticities of demand.
Superimposed on this there may be a tendency to shift from common to better quality teas as income increases. However, consumer preferences for beverages are somewhat fixed and switching from one beverage to the other may take place over a long period. Therefore the market for tea in the industrialized countries tends to increase in line with population growth. In developing countries, where income levels are lower, demand shows larger price and income elasticities. Estimates 4 show price elasticity of demand in the United Kingdom to be -0.32 for the period 1920-38 and income elasticity to be 0.04 (Stone, 1954) . Calculations of income elasticities for India based on cross section data for a later period, show the income elasticities in the urban and rural areas to be 1.11 and 1.047 respectively (Ayengar, 1967) . However, not much effort was made to exploit the domestic market until the 1930s.
In the 1930s the UK market remained stagnant as did other export markets. It was the domestic market in India which showed a dramatic increase. A market which had expanded by only 15 million pounds to 50 million lbs in the decade of the 1920s, showed an increase of 13 million pounds for 1933-34 and consumed over 100 million lbs of tea by the end of the 1930s (Indian tea statistics). India, in the 1930s, had become the second most important outlet for black teas although the per capita consumption was still very low. (Wickizer,1940 Therefore plucking not only affects the quantity of output, but also its quality. Coarser plucking implies an increase in the supply of common teas and therefore a lower average quality. Similarly, finer plucking reduces the supply of common teas, thereby raising average quality and prices.
THE INDIAN TEA INDUSTRY
The Indian tea industry was set up in the second half of the 19th century. The industry was organized as joint stock companies owning different plantations. An important feature of the pattern of control in the industry was the managing agency system -a few managing agents controlled a large number of tea plantations. (Bagchi, 1972 ).
An important implication of the managing agency system was that it may have permitted a higher degree of monopoly in the industry than is indicated by the number of firms in the industry. Although the industry had a very large number of plantations, each of which had a small share in total output, the share of each managing agent in total output was substantially larger. If the firms belonging to a single managing agent acted in concert, and sought to maximize the profits of the group as a whole, this implies that the industry is better viewed as an oligopoly than as a competitive industry. As we have already noted, most firms in Eastern India were controlled by a few managing agents. More than half the firms in our data set are controlled by 5 managing agents and these account Consequently, these managing agents would partly internalize the negative externality which expanding output conferred upon the industry as a whole.
The industry came to be organized into associations to represent the interest of the producers as early as the 1880s.
Indian Tea Association was founded in 1881 with representatives of nine managing agency houses which had major interests in tea. The setting up of district-level organizations followed. The Indian Tea Association was the dominant player in north India. There were several small associations representing Indian interests. They worked in harmony with the Indian Tea Association and usually emphasized their specific problems arising due to size (Griffiths, 1967) . Southern planters had their own association known as the United Planters' Association. Right from the beginning there was a difference between the two associations-while individuals dominated the functioning of the United Planters' Association and dissent was common, in the Indian Tea Association big companies exercised tight control (Griffiths, 1967) .
CONTROL SCHEMES
The attempts to restrict output in the 1930s were prompted by the decline in tea prices after 1925. Prices fell, both in Calcutta and in London, in the period 1925-29, and this decline was also accompanied by an accumulation of stocks -in 1929, the stocks in London represented six months' supply, the highest in 30 years. The first control scheme was devised at this point, and took effect in the year 1930. This scheme was backed by an international agreement, between the associations of tea producers of India, Ceylon and Indonesia. The agreement was that tea plantations would reduce output, and that the extent of output reduction would be greater for lower quality common teas. There was a gradation of four qualities, and the implicit quotas (which had no legal sanction) were fixed as a proportion of 1929 output. These proportions ranged from 85 percent, for the lowest quality producers, to 97 percent, to producers of premium tea.
From our perspective, the important aspect of the first control scheme is that compliance with the scheme was purely voluntary -there was no legislative action which enforced output reduction or regulated exports. Nevertheless, the aggregate data on tea production suggests that the scheme was successful in India, where output declined by 10 percent (International Tea Statistics). However, there were disagreements regarding continuation of the agreement. The main problem was that Indonesia was not perceived to be doing enoughthe reduction in Indonesian output was only 5 percent and further, producers in Indonesia were unhappy with the terms of the agreement. There were also divergent opinions within India -although the major tea producers of Eastern India would have liked an extension of the control scheme, the United Planters's Association representing producers in South India were divided in its opinion. The Chairman of the association spoke strongly against restrictions on output citing the failure of such schemes in coffee and rubber (Griffiths, 1967) . As a result, despite a dismal price situation, the control scheme was given up after one year, and there was no The year 1933 provides an extremely interesting year of transition. In January 1933, a referendum was held within the India tea industry, and showed 92 per cent of the producers in support of the scheme, with a mere 2.5 per cent dissenting and the rest were undecided (Griffiths, 1967 The year 1933 is more complex. As discussed in the previous section, there were no legal measures to restrict output, and the enforcement of export quotas only came at the end of the year. Further, since producers were aware that legally binding export quotas would be in force in the future, these anticipations could affect there current behaviour.
The tea producers of eastern India also made efforts to secure legislative control on output for the domestic market.
In June 1933, a referendum within the industry on a scheme to limit production for sale in India to 12 per cent of each estate's best crop showed a mixed response -the sterling companies in both east and south supported the scheme, but the southern rupee companies were divided. The scheme was not given legislative effect due to opposition from the United 
A SIMPLE MODEL OF NON-COOPERATIVE COLLUSION
Consider an oligopolistic industry with n firms, {1,2,..-,n}. We make two simplifying assumptions -first, the product is homogeneous, and second that all firms have identical cost functions. Let q i be the quantity produced by firm i and let the total output of the industry be denoted by:
The industry price is given by the inverse demand function p(Q). The firm's profits are given by:
Let Q -i denote the total output of all firms except firm i, that is Q -i = Q -q i .
Equation (2) reveals that the firm's profits depend on its own output (q i ) and the aggregate output of the other firms (Q -i ).
Write π(q i ,Q -i ) for this function.
Our focus is on symmetric equilibria. Suppose that all firms in the industry are producing q units of output. Define the best response of firm i, φ(q), by:
We assume that φ(q) is continuous and decreasing. A Cournot Nash equilibrium is a fixed point of this function, i.e. a (q*) such that q* = φ(q*). Under our assumptions, a Cournot Nash equilibrium exists and is unique.
Since the work of Friedman (1971) , it is well known that repeated interaction allows firms to collude. Suppose that the oligopoly is infinitely repeated and that firms maximize discounted profits, where δ is the discount rate. We now augment this simple model, to examine the effect of quotas, i.e. legally enforceable output restrictions.
First, quite obviously, quotas may allow a greater degree of output restriction than is feasible non-cooperatively. More subtle is the effect of an expected introduction of quotas in the future, which is relevant for our analysis of the year 1933. Suppose that firms expect quota levels q k to be enforced from the next period, where q k < q* . This implies that Cournot behaviour is no longer possible in the future. This makes collusion more difficult this period, since the quotas reduce the severity of future punishments. Current outputs (q i ) are supportable as an equilibrium if:
Since q k < q*, the right hand side of equation (5) is less than the right hand side of equation (4) and hence less collusion is possible in the current period. Further, consider the case where q k < q m , i.e. the quota seeks to enforce the an output reduction which is at least as low as that the industry can enforce non-cooperatively. In this case future punishment is completely ineffectual, and there can be no collusion today, i.e. the only equilibrium is where the industry chooses the Cournot output today. Hence we may conclude that the expectation of quotas in the future makes collusion more difficult today (see Rotemberg and Saloner, 1986, Shapiro, 1989 ).
The literature since Friedman has augmented this simple model of oligopolistic collusion in several ways. Abreu (1986) showed that firms could sustain a higher degree by taking recourse to punishments which were more severe than Cournot reversion. Green and Porter (1984) and Porter (1983) analyze the situation where firms could not monitor the output decisions of their rivals, and showed that collusion could nevertheless be supported.
These models of oligopolistic collusion consider the situation where all firms in the industry are partners to the collusive agreement, and where there is no new entry into the industry. This is not quite the case in the tea industry, where barriers to entry were not so significant. The industry had a "competitive fringe" of independent tea planters, who
were not controlled by managing agents. These plantations were mainly located in South India, were smaller in size then the plantations of Eastern India, and were mainly Indian owned.
Oligopoly theory suggests that these smaller firms would have less incentive to stick to a collusive agreement, since their marginal revenue from expanding output is large, due to their small effect on the market price. Legally enforceable quotas may therefore be more important in order to restrain such firms from expanding market share during the period of a collusive agreement. The existence of a competitive fringe is likely to have prompted the Indian Tea Association to lobby for legislative control rather than have an informal collusive arrangement within the industry.
EMPIRICAL RESULTS
We analyze two different types of data in this section of the 1920, 1930, 1933, and 1934-39 . We use two methods for proxying the expected price. The first is the lagged price of tea, which is valid as a regressor for the expected price if producers have adaptive expectations. The second approach is to assume that the producers have rational expectations. In this case the expected price equals the actual current price plus a white noise error term. In this case, we include the current price amongst our regressors, and use instrumental variables for estimation.
The results are reported in table 3. Two factors need to be noted. First, the elasticity of supply of tea is significantly different from zero in either estimation, and is around 15 percent. Secondly and more importantly from the point of view of this paper, the control schemes seem to have no signi-ficant effect on output. Although the coefficient on the control scheme dummy is negative, it fails to be statistically significant. This negative result seems robust across a number of different specifications that we estimated, and is noteworthy, since the many of the years witnessed explicit legal restrictions upon exports. We also experimented with a number of other specifications, including for example lagged output as a regressor, in order to allow for possible sluggish adjustment. These other regressors failed to be significant, and did not modify our basic results. This result may be contrasted with the results we obtain using firm level data, which we now turn to. In our view, the firm-level data is more informative since it provides information at the level of the micro-unit.
The focus of this paper is on firm level data, which We do not include the other years of export regulation since the reduction in output could be due to the existence of quotas and tight control exercised by the Licensing authority.
Our hypothesis is that the output of firm i, belonging to region j, in year t is given by the following supply function:
x it = α i + β 1 p jt + β 2 cs 30 + β 3 cs 33 + ε it ........ (7) where x it is the output of firm i in year t, and p jt is the price of tea in year t in the relevant region. cs 30 and cs 33 are dummy variables which take value 1 in the years 1930 and 1933
respectively. We estimate this basic equation in levels as well as in logs, i.e. taking ln x it and ln p jt . In either formulation we allow for firm specific fixed effects, i.e. we allow α i to differ across firms. This is a major advantage of our data set, i.e. that we are able to allow for heterogeneity across firms arising from differences in soil quality, past investment levels, managerial input, etc.
A remark is in order regarding the use of p jt , the region specific price, in the regression. We use the price as a proxy for demand shift variables, which we do not observe. The price variable will be exogenous only if the individual firm acts as a price taker. This assumption is of course open to questionour discussion of the managing agency system suggests that even if the individual firm is small, the managers of the firm could well take into account the negative effects of their output decisions upon other firms in the industry which were managed by the same agency. Accordingly, we estimate the equation by instrumental variables as well as ordinary least squares. We estimate a fixed-effects model using ordinary least squares. Next we assume price to be endogenous. We estimate the equation in first differences using lagged price and lagged output as instruments.
Tables 4 and 5 report our estimations. Table 4 reports the results for the specification in levels while table 5 shows our results for the specification in logs. Both tables report the ordinary least squares regression and the case when the price variable is instrumented. Our basic finding is robust and is replicated in all our regressions. The coefficients on both the control scheme variables is negative and statistically significant. The estimation procedure (OLS versus IV) does not affect the coefficients on the control scheme variables. The effect of the control scheme is larger in magnitude in 1933 than in 1930. This difference is significant-the null hypothesis is that β 2 is equal to β 3 rejected by an F-test. This is not surprising as the circumstances of the two control schemes were different as we have already discussed.
However, when we estimate a more restrictive formulation of equation (7) by using a single dummy variable for the control scheme, thereby restricting the coefficients to be identical, our basic result remains the same-the coefficient of the dummy variable is negative and statistically significant (see table 6 ).
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The other coefficient of interest is the coefficient of the price variable. This is positive in all the formulations and statistically significant when estimated with ordinary least squares.
AN EXPLANATION
Our main empirical finding is that the plantations in our were not willing to go along with the ITA on many occasions.
Collusion was effective within the same social group, but was not effective for "outsiders" to the group. The break down of collusive behaviour in the jute industry may be related to the presence of many firms outside the cartel, mainly representing Indian capital which led to considerable free-riding by firms outside as well as inside the jute mills' association (Goswami 1991 , Tomlinson 1993 . In the tea industry on the other hand the control of the expatriates dominant in the 1930s and they did collude successfully to increase international prices.
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The response of the firms in eastern India may be understood by looking at the colonial context and the operation of expatriate business. Many kinds of economic and non-economic entry barriers were used to maintain a privileged position. Restricting output to maintain prices was an accepted norm among the agents and was used in several industries. The role of social factors in the group behaviour may perhaps explain why firms voluntarily restricted output rather than play truant in an industry where the control of expatriate business was still dominant. The t-ratio is given in parentheses.
* denotes significant at 90 per cent. ** denotes significant at 95 percent.
*** denotes significant at 99 percent.
Source: Investors' India Year Books. 
